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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude
Rhoades, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14159
v.
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death of
Claude Rhoades.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash
service of process, held that attachment is an improper method
to confer jurisdiction in a v/rongful death case where the tort
sued upon arose in another state and pursuant to this holding
granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to vacate the writ of
attachment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the
lower court reversed, the writ of attachment reinstated and
the case remanded for a trial on the merits.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

: -

The following facts, in addition to those already
contained in Plaintiff-Appellant's first brief on file herein
and in addition to Defendants-Respondents1 statement of the
facts, appear pertinent to the matter before the Court.
Defendants have objected to Plaintiff's statement of
the facts as reciting information not introduced into evidence;
however, the facts Defendants find objectionable are taken
from the statement of facts in the decision of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals where that court considered whether
the federal district court had in personam jurisdiction based
on the Long Arm Statute or in rem jurisdiction based on the
unamended Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A
printed copy of that decision was filed in the San Juan
District Court by Defendants themselves and is included in
the Record on Appeal at page 43. While the action in federal
court was not identical to the present action insofar as the
question of jurisdiction is concerned, it was based on the
same incident or occurrence.

,--

Since this Court is now called upon to consider the
validity and bases of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction,
an understanding of the background and the facts alleged,
some of which are admittedly disputed, is essential to
determine whether error was committed by the court below when
it vacated the writ of attachment and ruled that attachment
based on the amended Rule 64C was not a proper means of

<A
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acquiring in rem jurisdiction.
No hearing has been held on the merits of the case
and no evidence received by the court below; consequently,
Plaintiff is limited in her statement of the facts to the
record now before the Court,
In addition to the foregoing facts, Plaintiff-Appellant
further supplements her statement with the following facts
pertaining to due process.
Before any writ of attachment issued in this case,
Defendants had already appeared specially on January 2, 1975
(R.6) and again on April 22, 1975 (R.9) and filed their
motions to quash service of process.

On May 1, 1975, before

any v/rit of attachment had issued, Defendants had filed their
notice of hearing (R.10) and memorandum of authorities (R.1329) wherein, in apparent anticipation that a writ of attachment would be issued, they argued that attachment is an
improper means of conferring in rem jurisdiction.

(R.22-26)

The writ of attachment in this case was not issued
until May 12, 19 75, two days before the hearing which had
been noticed up by Defendants wherein oral arguments and
memoranda of authorities were submitted to the court on the
issues, including the issue of in rem jurisdiction based on
attachment.

Although the writ of attachment was not included

in the Record on Appeal when it was transmitted to this Court,
the San Juan County Court docket reflects that it was issued
on May 12, 1975, and Plaintiff is prepared to produce the
3
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original writ issued by the clerk and dated May 1 2 , 1975.

The affidavit for attachment dated May 1 2 , 1975, is found on
pages 56 and 57 of the Record.
Thereafter the court granted Defendants 1 motion to
quash, held that attachment is an improper method to confer
jurisdiction and subsequently vacated Plaintiff's writ of
attachment

(R.64-65), hence this appeal.
ISSUES

1.

The prior decision in the federal court is not

res judicata as to jurisdiction.
2.

;

...^..a

Plaintiff acquired in rem or quasi in rem jurisdic-

tion over the Defendants 1 property situated in San Juan County
by virtue of her writ of attachment and it was reversible
error for the court to find otherwise and to subsequently
vacate Plaintiff's writ.
3.

—

The question raised by Defendants as to the consti-

tutionality of the Utah Attachment Rule is rendered moot by
the fact that before Plaintiff's writ had issued, Defendants
had entered a special appearance and had filed a notice of
hearing and memorandum of authorities, contesting, among other
things, in rem jurisdiction based on attachment.
4.

Aside from the fact that the question is moot, the

Utah Attachment Rule is constitutional.

-

^o.'^Z'&2&
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:

-
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By way of reply to Defendants' brief, Plaintiff submits
the following argument in addition to that contained on pages
%

•
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15 through 24 of her initial brief on appeal.
POINT I
THE PRIOR DECISION IN THE FEDERAL COURT IS NOT RES JUDICATA
AS TO JURISDICTION.
Plaintiff agrees that the doctrine of res judicata
applies to questions involving jurisdiction but submits that
the same rules also apply, requiring that the precise issue
be litigated and determined by prior decision before the
doctrine may be invoked.

The issue of in rem or quasi in rem

jurisdiction based on the amended Rule 64C was not squarely
presented to and determined by the federal court.
Defendants grossly misrepresent the nature of the
present action when they state at page 3 in their brief that
the "identical case" was originally brought in the Federal
District Court for Utah and there dismissed for lack of
personal and in rem jurisdiction.

Granted, the action in

federal court was based on the same incident or occurrence
as the instant action; however, the whole point of Plaintiff's
appeal in this case and the reason Plaintiff filed a new
action in the District Court of San Juan County is that
subsequent to the filing of the federal action and while the .
Defendants' appeal from the federal district court was
pending before the circuit court, this Court amended its Rule
64C by eliminating the very language which, according to the
circuit court decision, restricted Utah's Long Arm Statute
and attachment rule to "personal injury" or "injury to the
5
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person."

In other words, the amended Rule 64C and its basis

for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction was not considered
or ruled upon by the circuit court,

^ -

Defendants cite the following authorities at pages 7
and 8 of their brief in support of the proposition that res
judicata applies to all issues which could have been raised
in a prior proceeding:

Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures

Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954); 46 AM. JUR. 2d, Judgments,
Sec. 417 (1969); Burns v. Kepler, 147 Colo. 153, 362 P.2d
1037, 1039 (1961); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485
P.2d 1044 (1971); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379
(Utah 1974); Wheaton v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946
(1962).

All of the above cited authorities, however, address

themselves to the situation where the plaintiff had the
opportunity of raising and arguing a particular issue or
theory in the initial action as, for example, in the case of
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. where the court found that the
plaintiff could have raised his state claim along with his
federal claim when he filed in federal court.
In the instant case, when Plaintiff filed her initial
federal action, the amended Rule 64C was non-existent and
consequently was not within the issues as they were made or
tendered by the pleadings in that action.

The doctrine of

res judicata does not extend to such non-existent issues of
law.

-2r.i';^;:If ?i*j

:Jx•:;:••

6. BO-.'-C't?ifc- ¥:&.£€%*,

t f e t r - H ; o-£" '
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Defendants argue on page 5 of their brief that there
6
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is a split of authority on the question of whether a subsequent change in the law precludes application of res
judicata in a subsequent case. Plaintiff submits that the
better reasoned and great weight of authority, as indicated
in her initial brief, supports the principle that particularly where the change in the law is procedural, the doctrine
of res judicata will not apply because the question presented
is an entirely different one than was considered by the prior
court.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF ACQUIRED IN REM OR QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANTS" PROPERTY SITUATED IN SAN JUAN COUNTY BY VIRTUE
OF HER WRIT OF ATTACHMENT AND IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
COURT TO FIND OTHERWISE AND TO SUBSEQUENTLY VACATE PLAINTIFF'S
WRIT.
Plaintiff reiterates that she claims nothing by way of
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants as far as the narrow
issues of this appeal are concerned.
Defendants strain to make an issue out of the fact that
the events which gave rise to this cause of action occurred
in Colorado and that therefore the injury suffered by
Plaintiff and the decedent's estate in Utah constitutes, by
some mysterious reasoning, an "undefined, fictional, illusory
or insubstantial" loss.

(Defendants' brief, pages 11 and 14)

Defendants would have us believe that since Plaintiff lives
three-quarters of a mile on the Utah side of the Colorado
7
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border and since the death occurred barely over the border
on the Colorado side, somehow that makes Plaintiff's loss
"fictional, illusory or insubstantial."

Plaintiff is hard

pressed to see any logic in such reasoning.

Regardless of

where the physical act occurred, the real loss and injury
and therefore the tort arose in Utah where the Plaintiff
resides and where decedent's estate is.
Defendants also strain to support their argument that
Utah does not consider such a loss significant enough to
provide some means whereby its citizens may redress themselves
in Utah courts. ••••••'"

zp\~:~.*ry 'y^ #;:^-c.:^ y^. „--;-..,...•

::;--r

The case of Alpers v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 403
Pa. 626, 170 A.2d 360 (1961), heavily relied on by Defendants
to support their argument, is inapplicable here because that
case was decided on the basis of a 1937 Pennsylvania statute
which specifically limited writs of attachment on the property
of non-residents to torts committed within the State of
Pennsylvania.

As pointed out on pages 10-13 in Plaintiff's

initial brief, the Alpers decision has been severely criticized.
No such statute exists in Utah.

Plaintiff submits that the

authorities supporting the Alpers view are based on similar
statutes or case law.

4

Rule 64C contains no language which limits its application to tort acts committed within the state.
Plaintiff has found no Utah cases, the case of Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats and Motors, 27 Utah 2d 233, 494
8
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P.2d 532 (1972), being no exception, that hold that attachment
is an improper means of obtaining in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a non-resident where the events occurred
in another state•
The Hydroswift case deals only with the Long Arm
Statute and has no application to the attachment rule and in
rem jurisdiction.
Defendants1 argument that jurisdiction predicated on
attachment of the property of James C. Wright is improper
because he has transferred the property to his parents is
untenable.

Plaintiff specifically alleged in her complaint

(R.2) that subsequent to the shooting, "Defendant James C.
Wright, without consideration and for the intended purpose
of avoiding his debts, particularly the obligation owing to
Plaintiff . . . and thereby defrauding his creditors,
transferred and conveyed said property to the Defendants
Clifford Wright and Essie Wright, husband and wife."
The affidavit submitted by Plaintiff in support of her
writ of attachment specifically stated that the "Defendant
James C. Wright has assigned and disposed of real property
in the State of Utah with intent to defraud his creditors;
and that unless this attachment issue, said Defendants, and
each of them, will further attempt to assign and transfer
real property located in the State of Utah for the purpose
of avoiding the payment of the obligation herein sued upon,
and particularly the obligation owing to Plaintiff; that in
9
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order to obtain jurisdiction of the matter, it is necessary
that the Court issue a writ of attachment, retaining and
holding intact said property for the purpose of satisfying
in whole or in part any judgment which may be rendered in
favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants, or either of
them." -..5 -—-t -^^l-j^i^^

. r^cfc^afcr^m.ct:. a--::-c:-m-,.' -• ^-v,-/ .;•;

It would be improper for the Court to find the attachment improper on the basis of the transfer where Plaintiff's
claim of fraudulent transfer is one of the issues to be
litigated in the action.
That attachment, necessary to secure jurisdiction over
a non-resident in a state court, is considered a most basic
and important public interest is obvious from the cases of
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 65 L.Ed. 837, 41 S.Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R.
873 (1921); Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. My. 1973);
and United States Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, supra, 348 F.
Supp. 1022 (D. Del. 1972), discussed under Plaintiff's Point
IV herein.
POINT III
THE QUESTION RAISED BY DEFENDANTS AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE UTAH ATTACHMENT RULE IS RENDERED MOOT BY THE FACT THAT
BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S WRIT HAD ISSUED, DEFENDANTS HAD ENTERED A
SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND HAD FILED A NOTICE OF HEARING AND
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES, CONTESTING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN
REM JURISDICTION BASED ON ATTACHMENT.
10

::
l
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Defendants have no room to complain that they were
denied due process in the attachment procedure followed by
Plaintiff.
As Plaintifffs statement of facts discloses, before
any writ of attachment issued in this case Defendants had
already appeared specially on January 2, 1975, and again on
April 22, 1975, and filed their motions to quash service of
process.

On May 1, 1975, before any writ had been issued,

Defendants had filed their notice of hearing and memorandum
of authorities wherein, in apparent anticipation that a writ
of attachment would be issued, they argued that attachment
is an improper means of conferring in rem jurisdiction.
The writ of attachment was not issued until May 12,
1975, two days before the hearing which had been noticed up
by Defendants wherein oral argument and memoranda of
authorities were submitted by both sides on the issues,
including the issue of in rem jurisdiction based on attachment.
[The property was actually attached by the sheriff on May 13,
1975, the day before the hearing.]
Defendants had their day in court concerning the
attachment the day after their property was attached.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants to find any authority which
holds that such a procedure violates due process. The
question of the constitutionality of the Utah attachment rule
is therefore moot.

11
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POINT IV
ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION IS MOOT, THE UTAH
ATTACHMENT RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
In their discussion of the Fuentes case, Defendants
fail to acknowledge one of the most significant points
discussed and conclusions reached by that decision, a point
which has direct bearing on the instant action.
In Fuentes the United States Supreme Court discussed
three main criteria in determining the constitutionality of
replevin statutes:

(1) the existence of an Important

Governmental or General Public Interest; (2) the need for
prompt action and (3) the State's maintenance of strict
control over its monopoly of legitimate force.
The Fuentes court found that in most cases outright
seizure of property must be preceded by a prior hearing;
however, it specifically noted as follows:
In three cases, the Court has allowed the attachment
of property without a prior hearing. . . . Another
case involved attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court—clearly a most basic and important
public interest. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US 94, 65 L.Ed.
837, 41 S.Ct. 433, 17 ALR 873. (Emphasis added) 32
L.Ed.2d at 576, n.[29]
The Ownbey case, supra, cited by the court in Fuentes
contains some significant language concerning the historical
use of attachment to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident;
Our circumstances as a nation have tended peculiarly
to give importance to a remedy of this character. The
division of our extended domain into many different
states, each limitedly sovereign within its territory,
inhabited by a people enjoying unrestrained privilege
of transit from place to place in each state, and from
12
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state to state; taken in connection with the universal
and unexampled expansion of credit, and the prevalent
abolishment of imprisonment for debt, would naturally,
and of necessity, lead to the establishment, and, as
experience has demonstrated, the enlargement and
extension, of remedies acting upon the property of
debtors. 65 L.Ed, at 843.
But a property owner who absents himself from the
territorial jurisdiction of a state, leaving his
property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to
consent that the state may subject such property to
judicial process to answer demands made against him
in his absence, according to any practicable method
that reasonably may be adopted. A procedure customarily
employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial
metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the
states as suited to their circumstances and needs,
cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law,
even if it be taken with its ancient incident of
requiring security from a defendant who, after seizure
of his property, comes within the jurisdiction and
seeks to interpose a defense. The condition imposed
has a reasonable relation to the conversion of a
proceeding quasi in rem into an action in personam;
ordinarily it is not difficult to comply with—a man
who has property usually has friends and credit—and
hence in its normal operation it must be regarded as
a permissible condition. (Emphasis added) 65 L.Ed.
837 at 846 (1921)
The court in Ownbey further noted that legislation
providing for proceedings by attachment against non-residents,
as well as against absconding debtors, was passed by the
assembly of Delaware counties and the province of Pennsylvania
as early as March 24, 1770.
Defendants cite the case of Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F.
Supp. 574 (D. My. 1973), in support of their argument that
attachment used as a means of obtaining in rem jurisdiction
is unconstitutional.

That case, however, specifically cited

the Ownbey, supra, and Fuentes, supra, cases discussed above
and made it clear that the attachment procedure as a means of
13
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acquiring in rem jurisdiction over a non-resident comes within
the exception allowed in Fuentes.

Of particular importance

is the court's discussion of the question regarding how
"necessary" the attachment had to be to secure jurisdiction:
In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 ^
L.Ed. 837 (1921) , quasi in rem jurisdiction was
exercised by a Delaware court when a non-resident
plaintiff attached the shares of stock of a Delaware
corporation belonging to a non-resident defendant.
Although the consistency of the summary attachment
with due process was not addressed by the supreme
court, the present court in Fuentes approved of the
use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Ownbey because it
involved "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction
in state court—clearly a most basic and important
public interest." 407 U.S. at 91, n.23, 92 S.Ct. at
199. The court, however, failed to define with
sufficient specificity how "necessary" the attachment
had to be in securing jurisdiction. This omission has
prompted considerable controversy among courts and
commentators. On one hand, the majority of courts
considering the issue have implicitly found "necessity"
merely from the fact that the defendant was a nonresident and presumably not amenable to personal
service. See, e.g. United States Industries, Inc. v.
Gregg, supra, 348 F. Supp. at 1021; Schneider v.
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 744 (D. Mass. 1972).
On the other hand, commentators have argued that
"necessary" means the only way in which the state
could have obtained jurisdiction in the case. Thus
if an alternative procedure, such as a long arm statute,
would provide in personam jurisdiction, summary
attachment via quasi m rem action would not satisfy
the due process clause. (Emphasis added) 367 F. Supp
at 579
In the Roscoe case the court found that the return of
summonses twice non est is ample evidence that in personam
jurisdiction is not availablef and consequently the only way
in which a state can assert its jurisdiction over the
defendant is by use of a quasi in rem action.

In other words,

said the court, since the resident debtor's appearance cannot
14
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be obtained through the usual service of process procedures,
he is in the same position vis-a-vis state jurisdictional
authority as a non-resident.

The court concluded that the

Maryland attachment rule served a valid public interest
within the meaning of Fuentes.
It is significant that the facts of the instant case
satisfy both of the requirements of "necessity" discussed
above by the Roscoe decision.

In this case the Defendants

are non-residents and not amenable to service of process and
the circuit court has held that the Utah Long Arm Statute
cannot be used to obtain jurisdiction.

The circuit court's

decision may not be binding on this Court as to the law
regarding the long arm statute, but it may be binding on this
case as far as res judicata is concerned.

In any event, the

requirement of "necessity" for in rem jurisdiction in this
case is clearly satisfied.
The second test laid down in Fuentes is that of prompt
action.

Plaintiff submits that there is sufficient reason

for prompt action where the Defendant James C. Wright has
transferred his property to Defendants Clifford and Essie
Wright in an attempt to avoid jurisdiction of the Court and
where Plaintiff has cause to believe that Defendants may
further transfer or dispose of the property so as to avoid
jurisdiction and the obligation to Plaintiff.
The third criterion discussed in Fuentes is the state's
maintenance of strict control over its monopoly of legitimate
15
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force.

The court in that case did not specify the controls

that would be required in all cases.

It merely found, as

follows, that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes abdicate
effective state control over state power:
Private parties, serving their own private advantage,
may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods
from another. No state official participates in the
decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews
the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state
official evaluates the need for immediate seizure.
There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff
provide any information to the court on these matters.
The state acts largely in the dark. 32 L.Ed.2d 556 at
577.
By contrast to the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes,
the Utah Attachment Rule imposes the following controls:
(1) The plaintiff must submit an affidavit, after
filing a complaint, setting forth the following: (a) that
the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, specifying the
amount thereof and the nature of the indebtedness; (b) that
the attachment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any
creditor of the defendant; (c) that the payment of the same
has not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or
personal property situate or being in this state and alleging,
but not in the alternative, one of seven listed causes for
attachment (two of which are here relevant): (i) that the
defendant is not a resident of this state and (ii) such other
additional facts showing probable cause for being and that
plaintiff is justly apprehensive of losing his claim unless
a writ of attachment issue.
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(2)

An official of the state then issues the writ of

attachment upon the filing by the plaintiff of the required
affidavit, together with an undertaking on the part of the
plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in a sum of not less
than double the amount claimed by the plaintiff.

The

conditions of the undertaking are such that if the defendant
recovers judgment or if the attachment is wrongfully issued,
the plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to the
defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the attachment.
(3)

There is also a provision in 64C(4) for a post

attachment hearing where the defendant may at any time, upon
such notice to the plaintiff as the court may require, make
a motion to the court in which the action is pending to have
the writ of attachment discharged on the ground that the same
was improperly or irregularly issued.
Plaintiff submits that the above procedures and controls
required by Rule 6 4C are more than sufficient to meet the
standards imposed by Fuentes and the other authorities cited
by Defendants.

Defendants' argument that the Utah rule is

unconstitutional because it provides for no post attachment
hearing is without merit in view of the above discussion.
The case of U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, supra,
involves attachment used to obtain in rem jurisdiction over
a non-resident's property.

In that case the court held as

follows:
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The Supreme Court's footnote characterization of the
attachment in the Ownbey case supplies the answer to
the initial inquiry of whether the seizure was "directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest." This is not a case like Fuentes
where the statutes allowed "summary seizure" when "no
more than [a] private gain is directly at stake."
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 93, 92 S.Ct. at 2000. As
previously noted a state has a legitimate interest in
the exercise of judicial jurisdiction with respect to
property within its borders. Seizure for the purpose
of securing such jurisdiction in a state court,
accordingly, serves, in the words of the Supreme Court,
"a most basic and important public interest." (Emphasis
added) 348 F. Supp. 1004 at 1021
:

Here, unlike Fuentes, the order effecting the seizure
was issued by a state court judge. That judge had been
supplied with a complaint and with an affidavit which
revealed: (1) that Gregg was a non-resident and accordingly not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
court, (2) that Gregg owned specifically described,
alienable property within the State of Delaware, (3)
the value of that property and (4) the source of the
plaintiffs1 information on these subjects. This
information provided the basis for a determination
that the seizure would be in furtherance of the
"important public interest" underlying the sequestration statute and that prompt action would be required. 348
F. Supp at 1022
Plaintiff submits that the Utah Attachment Rule and

the procedure followed in the present action comply with all
of the standards enumerated by the Supreme Court in Fuentes
and that Rule 64C is therefore constitutional.
"•"•'" CONCLUSION
Defendants' argument that res judicata applies is
without merit for t M following reasons:
/•'•'•••• 1.

The question of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction

based on the amended Rule 6 4C was never considered by the
circuit court and was not within the issues as they were
tendered in the pleadings to that court because Rule 64C in
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its amended form was non-existent at the time Plaintiff filed
her action and at the time Defendants took their appeal.
2.

A subsequent change in a procedural rule precludes

the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
Defendants' argument that the lower court was without
in rem jurisdiction based on Plaintiff's writ of attachment
must be rejected for the following reasons:
1.

There is no statutory or judicial authority in Utah

which precludes the use of attachment as a means of obtaining
in rem jurisdiction over the Defendants' property where the
events from which the cause of action arose occurred in
another state and where the injury and loss is sustained by
the Plaintiff residing in Utah.
2.

This Court has recognized the use of attachment as

a means of obtaining in rem jurisdiction over the property of
a non-resident.
3.

[Plaintiff's initial brief, p.13, et seq.]

The United States Supreme Court has recognized

attachment as a necessary means of securing jurisdiction in
state court and a most basic and important public interest.
(Plaintiff-Appellant's reply brief, Point IV)
Defendants' constitutional challenge is moot because
they were afforded ample due process by the procedures
followed as discussed in Plaintiff's Point III herein.

In

any event, the Utah Attachment Rule is constitutional for the
reasons discussed under Plaintiff's Point IV herein.
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